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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Appellant cited on page 7 of his brief that the determinative law was Rule 56, U R C P , 
and the cases which are based thereon, eleven of which are set forth on pages 22 - 26 of said 
brief 
NATURE OF CASE, PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
Substantially correct 
DREITZLER* S BRIER NON - COUNTERED ISSUES 
It is important to note that the following seven issues brought up by Appellant in his Brief 
were not addressed nor countered by Appellees in their brief, and thus must now be considered to 
l2£ non-contested issues These seven non-contested issues which are described and located as 
follows support the two following genuine disputed issues of material fact that are claimed by 
Appellant and denied by Appellees and Judge Medley 
Seven Uncontested Issues 
1 Appellee Dreitzler gave Appellant Harrison copies of two flooring loan 
arrangements he already had with Zions Bank See Appellant's Brief, Addendum 
A-18andA-19 
2 Draper Bank Vice President Glen Cherrington's affidavit explains the $14,000 00 
flooring loan that Appellee Dreitzler had agreed to pay back directly to the bank 
See Appellant's Brief, Addendum A-21, and R 86 
3 Werner's bill for repairs made to the 1987 Mercedes trade-in, dated August 8, 
1997, was made out to Werner's Mercedes Repair, and not to Appellant Harrison 
See Appellant's Brief, Addendum A-15 and also Addendum B-2 to this Reply 
Brief, attached hereto 
4 The Vehicle Contract of Sale, dated August 1, 1997, clearly shows an 
overpayment of $14,000 00 made by Appellant to Appellee Dreitzler See 
Appellant's Brief, Addendum A-5 
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5. No consignment agreement, as required by Utah law, was ever discussed or signed 
by the parties regarding the 1987 Mercedes that the Vehicle Contract of Sale 
shows to be a trade-in. See Appellant's Brief, Addendum A-12 and A-13, and R. 
740 and 741. 
6. Appellees, through their counsel, Phillip W. Dyer filed with the lower court a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Appellant's original 
Motion for summary judgement filed on July 8, 1998, (See Appellant's Brief, 
Addendum A-17, and also Addendum B-3 to this Reply Brief, attached hereto). In 
this memorandum, Mr. Dyer detailed multiple disputed facts which convinced 
Judge Medley as of that date that summary judgement was not an appropriate 
ruling in this case. 
7. Appellees' attorney Phillip W. Dyer gave Judge Medley only page 85 of 
Appellant's May 13, 1998, Deposition. 
Disputed Material Fact No. 1 Claimed by Appellant 
"The 1987 Mercedes was a trade-in and not a consignment to Appellees 
Dreitzler/Werner's Mercedes Repair". This Disputed Fact is supported by non-
contested issues numbers 1, 3, 5, and 7, above. 
Disputed Material Fact No. 2 Claimed by Appellant 
"The $14,000.00 loan from Draper Bank was in fact a flooring loan for Appellees 
Dreitzler/Werner's, who orally agreed both to Appellant and Glen Cherrington, 
Vice President of Draper Bank, to pay back said loan in full to Draper Bank in 
exchange for the title to the 1987 Mercedes". This Disputed Fact is supported by 
non-contested issues numbers 1, 2 and 4, above. 
It is understandable that Judge Medley could set aside these two genuine issues of 
disputed material fact if he thought that Appellant, in his Deposition dated May 13, 1998, had 
admitted that the 1987 Mercedes had indeed not been traded in to Appellees Dreitzler/Werner's, 
because the title to said Mercedes did not pass to Appellees DreitzlerAVerener's at the time of the 
sale closing. 
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However, a Hill and proper reading of all of the relevant pages (83 - 85) of said deposition 
reveals that the title to the 1987 Mercedes instead passed through Appellees DreitzlerAVemer's 
at the sale closing, and then to Draper Bank as collateral for the $14,000 00 flooring loan, as 
planned by Appellant Accordingly, Appellant had not admitted at all in his May 13, 1998, 
Deposition that the 1987 Mercedes had not been traded in to Appellees DreitzlerAVemer's at said 
sale closing, and thus the above described disputed issues of material fact must be re-examined 
MISREPRESENTATION BY APPELLEE RON DREITZLER 
In Appellees' Brief on Page 13, Appellees state 
"In December, 1997, Dreitzler first discovered that Harrison had never had the 1987 
Mercedes titled in Harrison's name (R 139) As a result, Dreitzler then informed Harrison that 
Werner's would no longer accommodate Harrison in his efforts to attempt to sell the 1987 
Mercedes on Werner's lot and Dreitzler delivered the vehicle to Draper Bank as lien holder" (R 
139-140) 
Yet the Vehicle Contract of Sale which Appellee Dreitzler signed on August 1, 1997, over 
four months earlier, states that he had accepted this 1987 Mercedes as a trade-in Even if, as 
Dreitzler claims, said 1987 Mercedes was actually a consignment, which Appellant denies and 
Appellee Dreitzler cannot substantiate with any consignment agreement as required by Utah law 
under Section 41-3-803(7), (see Addendum A-7 of Appellant's Brief and also Addendum B-1 to 
this Reply Brief, hereto, Section 41-3-803, "The Utah Consignment Act"), it defies logic and 
common sense to believe that any car dealer would accept a vehicle either as a trade-in or a 
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consignment without first having inspected the title of said vehicle and ascertaining that the seller 
had proper title. 
Thus, for Appellee Dreitzler to claim that he first found out in December, 1997, that 
Appellant had not yet put the title to said 1987 Mercedes in his own name (although he had a 
valid and proper bill of sale), must not be true, and it would appear that Appellee Dreitzler simply 
made up this story in an attempt to justify and cover his dumping of said 1987 Mercedes in the 
Draper Bank parking lot in December, 1997. (See Appellant's Brief, Addendum A-16). 
This contempt for the truth is the same driving force that has motivated Appellee Dreitzler 
to deny that the 1987 Mercedes was traded-in to him (Werner's), as shown in the August 1, 1997 
Vehicle Contract of Sale (See Appellant's Brief, Addendum A-5), and to falsify instead that it 
was a consignment without any consignment agreement signed by the parties, as required by law 
(Utah: 41-3-803-7, the Consignment Sales Act, see Appellant's Brief, Addendum A- 7), and also 
for Appellee Dreitzler to deny the oral agreement of a $14,000.00 flooring loan with Appellant, 
which loan was described both by Appellant and also by Glen Cherrington, Vice President of 
Draper Bank, in his affidavit (R. 86), and also implied by Appellee Dreitzler himself, in that he 
gave Appellant copies of his similar flooring loan agreements with Zions Bank for him to inspect 
and to give to Draper Bank as examples. (See Appellant's Brief, Addendum A-18 and A-19). 
MISREPRESENTATION BY APPELLEES* ATTORNEY PHILLIP W. DYER 
* In Webster v. Still 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983), it held that a party who 
contradicts his own deposition cannot use his own affidavit to raise an issue of fact unless he can 
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provide an explanation of the discrepancy. Appellees quote this case in their Brief at page 18, as 
follows: 
"When a party takes a clear position in a deposition, that is not 
modified on cross-examination, he may not thereafter raise an 
issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his deposition, 
unless he can provide an explanation of the discrepancy" 
(Emphasis added) 
Appellant in his Brief on page 15 outlined the fact that Appellees' attorney, Phillip W. 
Dyer had given Judge Medley only page 85 of Appellant's Deposition dated May 13, 1998, and 
both Attorney Dyer and the Judge had interpreted that single page to mean that Appellant had 
admitted that the 1987 Mercedes had not been traded in because title to said Mercedes had not 
been transferred to Appellee Dreitzler at the time of the sale closing. 
As further carefully set forth on pages 16-21 of said Appellant's Brief, Appellant explains 
that when his testimony on pages 83 and 84 of his deposition is also read, he stated that transfer 
of the title to the 1987 Mercedes was not to take place until Appellee Dreitzler paid off the 
$14,000.00 flooring loan at Draper Bank, who was holding the title to the 1987 Mercedes as 
collateral for the flooring loan. Thus, it was proper for the title of the 1987 Mercedes not to be 
transferred to Appellee Dreitzler at the sale closing, and failure to do that did not mean that said 
vehicle was not traded in to Appellee Dreitzler. 
Appellees' counsel, Phillip W. Dyer states on page 2 of Appellees' Brief as follows: 
"After re-reading Harrison's brief several times, counsel for Dreitzler 
and Werner's believe Harrison's issues for appeal are as follows", 
which shows that he had carefully read Harrison's Brief. Yet on page 18 of Appellees' Brief, Mr. 
Dyer states as follows: 
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"No explanation has ever been offered by Harrison reconciling his 
deposition testimony and his contradictory affidavits. Without 
such explanation, Harrison's affidavits were correctly rejected 
by the trial court. SeeR. 447, R. 832 at page 26, line 7, to page 
27, line 2. The trial court thus correctly determined the 1987 
Mercedes had never been traded to Werner's and the trial court's 
orders should be affirmed." 
Mr. Dyer further states on page 13 and 14 of Appellees' Brief as follows: 
"All of the evidence before the trial court, including Harrison's 
own deposition testimony, was that the 1987 Mercedes was never 
traded by Harrison to Werner's because title never passed to 
Werner's. Harrison's own deposition testimony, in fact, was 
that the title to the 1987 Mercedes was never transferred to 
Werner's as it would have been had the vehicle actually been 
traded to Werner's. The only evidence to the contrary were 
Harrison's self-serving affidavits, filed after he understood the 
affect of his deposition testimony, in which he boldly asserted 
that the 1987 Mercedes was traded to Werner's. As a matter 
of law, Harrison's affidavits are insufficient to contradict his 
deposition testimony and he cannot use his own inconsistent 
testimony to create a disputed issue of material fact" 
For Mr. Dyer to try to mislead and to convince this Court on this crucial and pivotal 
point, that no explanation of the discrepancy had ever been offered by Harrison regarding his 
deposition testimony, when admittedly, Mr. Dyer had carefully read said Appellant's Brief 
including pages 13-21 of said Brief which, as outlined above, provides a detailed explanation of 
the discrepancy, one must question the good faith of Appellees' representations in their Brief, as 
we have already questioned his individual client's prior assertion that he did not inspect the title of 
the 1987 Mercedes trade-in prior to his trying to sell said vehicle for over four months on his car 
lot. 
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JUDGE MEDLEY'S COMMENTS ON TRADE-IN OF 1987 MERCEDES 
On Page 19 of their Brief, Appellees argue that Werner's was entitled to judgement as a 
matter of law because there was no genuine issue of material fact In fact, Judge Medley on 
October 1, 1998, (R 832) asked counsel for Appellees, (Referring to the Vehicle Contract of 
Sale), as follows 
"But isn't that document evidence of an agreement that it's a trade-in?*' 
The response of Appellees* counsel, Phillip W Dyer, was as follows 
"It is evidence that there may have been a trade-in, that is true " 
The Court responded 
"Exactly" 
In short, there was (and is) a genuine issue(s) of a material fact regarding the trade-in of the 
1987 Mercedes, and hence summary judgement was improper in light of the law set forth in the 
eleven cases set forth on pages 22 - 26 of Appellant's Brief, as the Judge decided in Appellant's 
initial Motion for Summary Judgement against Appellees in this case (See Addendum B-3 attached 
hereto) If this Court determines that there are genuine issues as to any material fact existing in 
this case, then it should reverse the lower court's decision and remand this case for trial 
HARRISON'S BRIEF COMPLIES WITH RULE 24 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Harrison's Brief did in fact "contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority" 
Smith v Smith 1999 ut App 378, Para No 8, 384 Utah Adv 30 
Contrary to Appellees' claim, Harrison has cited eleven cases, pp 22-26, which he 
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contends are each applicable to this case on appeal, as they each held that it was error for the trial 
court to grant summary judgement when there was a genuine factual dispute that first had to be 
tried. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure does not define "argument". In its 
absence, we turn to Black's Law Dictionary which defines the term as follows: 
Argument. 1. A statement that attempts to persuade; esp., 
the remarks of counsel in analyzing and pointing out or 
repudiating a desired inference, for the assistance of a 
decision-maker. 2. The act or process of attempting to persuade. 
The eleven cases cited in Appellant's Brief, pp. 22-26, were obviously cited in a statement 
that attempts to persuade. It constituted counsel's analysis in pointing out a desired inference for 
the assistance of the decision-maker in this appeal. 
Secondarily, it was an act or process of attempting to persuade. 
As to Appellant's deposition, it is not true that "Harrison cited no legal authority 
whatsoever and fails to provide the Court with any legal basis to review the trial court's decision". 
The same eleven cases referred to in the last paragraph above provide this Court with a legal basis 
on which to review the correctness of the trial court's decision on this issue. 
Thus, Harrison has not impermissibly placed the burden of analysis on this Court, but 
rather has argued that the application of Rule 56 U.R.C.P. to this case requires that the summary 
judgements entered herein are erroneous and should be reversed. 
On page 21 of their Brief, Appellees cite Smith v Smith. 1999 Ut App., 370 #10784 Adv. 
Rep. 30, (also reported in 995 Pac 2nd 14) as authority for this court to affirm the decision below. 
It should be noted, however, that such case is easily distinguishable from the instant case in 
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several particulars. First, that case involved a divorce. This one does not. Second, there the court 
found that appellant had not met the minimal requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedures, whereas that issue is one raised by Appellees and countered by Appellant 
(See prior page). Third, the court there held that briefs must contain "reasoned analysis based 
upon relevant authority". Here, Appellant has set forth reasoned analysis based upon relevant 
authority (See pages 22 - 26 of Appellant's Brief). 
Of course, as noted in Smith, the Appellant respectfully bears the burden of persuasion. 
Appellant respectfully submits that he has borne that burden in the instant case. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THERE WAS NO GENUINE 
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT, AND THAT WARNER'S WAS ENTITLED TO 
JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER QF LAW 
Under this subject matter, counsel for Appellees on pages 17 and 18 of their Brief 
acknowledged that there were two "Potential Support" bases in the record regarding the trade-in 
vehicle, to wit: (1), the Sales Agreement itself (R.6), and (2), multiple affidavits of Appellant 
which they denominated as "self serving" (R.412, 441, 443). They neglected to admit a third one 
which was identified by Judge Medley, (R.832, p.23). See R.454, a bill for $791.91, for repairs to 
the 1987 Mercedes, made out to Werner's Mercedes Repair, and not Appellant, as it otherwise 
would have been made out to if the 1987 Mercedes had actually been a consignment rather than a 
trade-in. (See R. 454, and also Appellant's Brief, Addendum A-15, and repeated in this Reply 
Brief as Addendum B-2, hereto). 
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Any one of the above three items of evidence creates a genuine factual dispute that 
precludes summary judgement under the principle of the eleven cases cited previously 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
In the lower court, Appellees, sought for an award of attorneys fees and the court 
exercised his discretion by denying the same Even if the lower court is sustained in this case, the 
discretionary award of attorneys' fees should result in the same ruling on appeal 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Judge Medley was misled to believe that Appellant had admitted in his deposition dated 
May 13, 1998, that he had not traded-in the 1987 Mercedes to Werner's, which led the Judge to 
dismiss the issues of disputed material facts in his ruling for summary judgements Now that a 
proper reading of said Appellant's deposition shows that no such admission was ever made by 
Appellant, the case needs to be reversed in light of the genuine issues of material fact that still 
exist, and remand for trial 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of May, 2000 
KUJUJ: & ^H^^t 
Robert B Hansen 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
B-l. Copy of UTAH LAW, Section 41-3-803, J.C.A 1953, 
et al, "The Utah Consignment Act", which mandates 
a written agreement prior to the consigned vehicle 
being driven on a dealer's license plates. 
Also referred to in Appellant's Brief as Addendum 
A-7 
MOTOR VEHICLE BUSINESS REGULATION 41-3-803 
41-3-803. Consignment sales. 
(1) A consignor may take possession of his consigned vehicle at any time 
the consigned vehicle is in the possession of a consignee, provided that the 
consignor: 
(a) has notified the consignee in writing that he will take possession of 
the consigned vehicle; and 
(b) has paid all outstanding charges owing to the consignee that have 
been agreed to by the consignor in accordance with Subsection (2). 
(2) The agreed upon charges under Subsection (1Kb) shall be: 
(a) in writing; 
(b) on a form designed by the department; and 
(c) attached to the written consignment agreement. 
(3) A consignee who sells a consigned vehicle shall report to the consignor 
in writing the exact selling price of the consigned vehicle under either of the 
following circumstances: 
(a) the consignor and consignee agree in writing that the consignor 
shall receive a percentage of the selling price upon the sale of the vehicle; 
or 
(b) the consignor and consignee renegotiate in writing the selling price 
of the vehicle. 
(4) When a consignee sells a consigned vehicle: 
(a) the consignee, within seven calendar days of the date of sale, must 
give written notice to the consignor that the consigned vehicle has been 
sold; and 
(b) the consignee, within 21 calendar days of the date of sale, or within 
15 calendar days of receiving payment in full for the consigned vehicle, 
whichever date is earlier, shall remit the payment received to the con-
signor, unless the agreement to purchase the consigned vehicle has been 
rescinded before expiration of the 21 days. 
(5) If the agreement to purchase the consigned vehicle has for any reason 
been rescinded before the expiration of 21 calendar days of the date of sale, the 
consignee shall within five calendar days thereafter give written notice to the 
consignor that the agreement to purchase has been rescinded. 
(6) Vehicles on consignment shall be driven with the consignee's dealer 
plates. All other license plates or registration indicia must be removed from 
the vehicle. 
<7) Prior to driving a consigned vehicle on the consignee's dealer plates, the 
consignee and the consignor shall execute a written consignment agreement 
that states: 
(a) the party responsible for damage or misuse to a consigned vehicle; 
and 
(b) the permitted uses a consignee may make of a consigned vehicle. 
<8) The consignee shall keep the written consignment agreement on file at 
tos principal place of business. 
Hiitory: C. 1953, 41-3-803, enacted by L. came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
»W. ch. 167, § 3. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 167 be-
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ADDENDUM 
B-2. COPY OF WERNER'S BILL FOR REPAIRS 
MADE TO THE 1987 MERCEDES TRADE-IN, 
DATED AUGUST, 1997, 
WERNER'S MERCEDES REPAIR, INC. 
3113 SO. WEST TE?. JL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115 
(801) 467-8220 
•*& s«s*a ^ t P M m ^ 
Date 
-d ± 1 1"397 
INVOICE 
Z H C ? 
Ph (res) Tax 
Street ZLL5 3 W T E M P L E Crty/State/Zip 5 L C . UT 3 4 1 1 5 
^ a k g M o d e ( 0 0 5 D L 
ggm^ed
 i 9 9 ? p Completed 
&9k£ff$SD-<HA2835C? ^ 8 ^ 2 3 
LabofcR|kte Mechatfi 16-
Quantity Description rt Number 
, LOfl ^L.UU PLH * ( f t l ^ . v v 
r8260S5<5 1 RIM HEADLAMP RIGHT 100.00 
'8262490 i LENS SCUARE BEAM LEFT 75.00 
.nOOloi 1 HHDL. INT. FR/PEAR L 15.00 
7201346 i HH00H REGULATOR L FRONT 83.00 
»7i;0°46 1 HI*DGK RES0LAT0R L/'R 94.00 
21469334 1 POWER ANTENNA 95.00 
,8201301 1 LAMP GLOVE/UNDER 00CR 1.90 
601012230 1 BULB 12Y/5N 16418 1.10 
569C521 1 «K&SH. HASHER PUJ1P 18.0C 
9973681 1 63GHHIT HASHER PUflP 0.50 
r7C081 1 MODULATOR CAP 1.10 
Unit price 
130.00 
75.00 
15.0; 
83. Jo 
94.00 
95.00 
1.90 
1.10 
18. CO 
0.50 
1.10 
100.00 
75.00 
15.00 
33.00 
94.00 
95.00 
1J0 
1.10 
18.00 
, 0.50 
1.10 
Work performed 
v f l w v U u U n W ! w > i L l t 
Amount. 
REPLACED HEADLIGHT DOORS 
REPLACED LEFT HEADLIGHT LENS 
REPLACED MIVERS UhDOl LIFTER 
REPLHCED LEFT REAR LIFTER 
IHSTALL POWER ft«TE«»A 
REPLACED VASkER PW 
1.5 
1.5 
1 0 
0.3 
87.00 
87.00 
58.40 
17.40 
7£W fa* 
Previous Invoice 
Total Parts 
Total Labor 
Total Parts & Labor 
Sales Tax 
2448 
i.l 
TOTAL $ 
H 
496.60 
249.40 
746-00 
45.5i 
' ' I / I 1 
DISCLAIMER OF WARHAMTIES Tp> Q«y Aaifai»ti«>s aopU n j to i n ^ -_:?iac-»rr>,>-" 
P ) i o oanv a r« T>~se Artich <~iay be o"e<cd t» n » man w i . j au re ' T^« s* i «q v-»3 e f 
KS e?f j»^re5Siv 3 ..cia rn* al l warrant es ^ the express or i-npiied *c - -q a*<* 
trip
 t j AAnaoi#es a' rr»l<' Chanlab htv or I inet;s 'or a Dart cuiar p j ' p a s * and -> t-er 
i ^ u - f s i0» author ise* m y nersen o assume '0« t any i shit ty n connect r n * •> 
the « i o of a"w pari or pa ts and or ^srvi^e Buy*"' s*ia" not t j * enitPeo to ' * r - v e ' 
'••o-,
 (r>e , * u ng dealer anv cooseq jenUaP damea** damages f0 loss ;f u<se JS» 3' 
trr^e OoS of pro«if or income or any o t " « ' incidental damages 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL - 8 1998 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS D. HARRISON, j 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
RON DREITZLER and WERNER'S ] 
MERCEDES REPAIR ] 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION 
> TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED 
JUNE 25, 1998 (ORAL ARGUMENT 
1 REQUESTED) 
) Civil No. 98-0900524 CN 
• Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Defendants, by and through their undersigned counsel, submit 
the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition 
to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment dated June 25, 1998. 
INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to the mandate of Rule 4-501(2)(a) of the Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration, plaintiff has not filed a Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities setting forth the material facts "as to 
which movant contends no genuine issue exists." Defendants1 
response is therefore directed to the "facts" claimed by 
1 
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plaintiff in his Affidavit dated June 25, 1998. 
Defendants assert, however, that plaintiff's Motion should 
be summarily denied as the result of his noncompliance with Rule 
4-501(2) (A) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
DISPUTED FACTS 
1. In paragraph 2 of his Affidavit dated June 25, 1998, 
plaintiff asserts that checks were issued to defendant Werner's 
Mercedes Repair (herein Werner's). For purposes of this Motion, 
defendant Werner's admits that plaintiff paid checks totalling 
$19,469.34 towards the purchase of the 1991 Mercedes. 
2. With respect to paragraph 2 of plaintiff's Affidavit 
dated June 25, 1998, defendant Werner's denies that plaintiff 
"traded-in" both the 1987 Mercedes and the 1989 Dodge Van. The 
1989 Dodge Van was sold for $2,500.00 and applied towards the 
purchase of the 1991 Mercedes. The 1987 Mercedes, however, was 
never traded to defendant Werner's but was taken, as an 
accommodation to plaintiff, on a consignment basis. See 
Affidavit of Ron Dreitzler dated April 20, 1998, a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
3. Mr. Harrison's deposition testimony is factually 
inconsistent with his assertion, in his Affidavit dated June 25, 
1998, because he admits the 1987 Mercedes was never traded in to 
2 
defendant Werner's: 
Q: [by Mr, Dyer] Walk slowly with me. When 
you transfer a title to — when you transfer 
and sell an automobile, would you agree you 
have to transfer the title? 
A: [by Mr. Harrison] Yes. 
Q: [by Mr. Dyer] At any point in time has Mr. 
Dreitzler or Werner's Mercedes ever become 
the owner of the 1987 Mercedes by transfer of 
a title to him or Werner's Mercedes Repair? 
Yes or no. 
A: [by Mr. Harrison] I guess not. 
See Deposition of Thomas D. Harrison, pertinent portions of which 
are attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
4. Further, Mr, Harrison's actions are contradictory to the 
claims in his Affidavit that the 1987 Mercedes was a "trade-in": 
a) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff entered into a loan 
agreement with Draper Bank and Trust. Plaintiff borrowed 
$14,000.00; the loan was secured in part by the 1987 Mercedes at 
issue in this case. The documents indicate that the primary 
source of repayment was to be Mr. Harrison's personal income. 
See Loan Approval Sheet, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit C and incorporated herein by this reference. Werner's 
was not a party to this loan agreement. 
b) On October 31, 1997, plaintiff entered into a Change 
of Terms Agreement with Draper Bank and Trust. The loan remained 
3 
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secured in part by the 19 87 Mercedes at issue in this case* See 
Change in Terms Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit D and incorporated herein by this reference. Werner's 
was not a party to the original loan agreement or to this Change 
in Terms Agreement-
c) On July 28, 1997, plaintiff executed a Power of 
Attorney in which he avers that he is the "bona fide registered 
owner of the following described motor vehicle: 1987 Mercedes 
Benz 300 SDL". See Power of Attorney attached hereto as Exhibit 
E and incorporated herein by this reference. 
5. Neither defendants nor Draper Bank have viewed, or 
presently view, anyone but plaintiff as the owner of the 1987 
Mercedes: 
Q: [by Mr. Dyer] ... The only power of 
attorney we have with respect to the 1987 
Mercedes in file is by Mr. Harrison. Are you 
aware of any other power of attorney beyond 
the one that's on Page 76? 
A: [by Ms. Householder] No. 
Q: [by Mr. Dyer] So as of July 28th, 1993[7], 
from your perspective, the owner of the 1987 
Mercedes was in fact Mr. Harrison, was it 
not? 
A: [by Ms. Householder] On the flooring loans 
that I have dealt with -
Q: [by Mr. Dyer] That's a "yes" or "no", ma'am. 
A: [by Ms. Householder] Tell me the question again. 
4 
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Q: [by Mr. Dyer] The question is as of the July 28th, 
1993[7], after reviewing Page 76 of Exhibit 1, from 
your perspective as a loan originator now as manager of 
the West Jordan Bank, Mr, Harrison was the owner of the 
1987 Mercedes; correct? 
A: [by Ms. Householder] He did sign this power of 
attorney, but the title was not in his name. Yes. 
Q: [by Mr. Dyer] So the answer to that question is 
"yes11 then? 
A: [by Ms. Householder] Yes. 
Q: [by Mr. Dyer] Okay. And if you believed 
that Mr, Dreitzler was the owner, you would 
have had him sign a similar power of attorney 
in behalf of either himself or Wernerrs as 
set forth on Page 76 for Mr. Harrison, true? 
A: [by Ms. Householder] Yes. 
See Deposition of Patty Householder, pertinent portions of which 
are attached hereto as Exhibit F and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Mr. Harrison's deposition testimony was that the written 
agreement upon which his summary judgment motion is predicated 
does not reflect the complete agreement of the parties: 
Q: [by Mr. Dyer] What I'm trying to get at, 
Deposition Exhibit 1 [the Motor Vehicle 
Contract of Sale] does not represent your 
complete deal, does it? 
A: [by Mr. Harrison] Deal meaning to purchase 
the car? 
Q: [by Mr. Dyer] The whole transaction. 
5 
A: [by Mr. Harrison] No, it does not 
represent the whole transaction. 
See Deposition of Thomas D. Harrison, pertinent portions of which 
are attached hereto as Exhibit G and incorporated herein by this 
reference* 
ARGUMENT 
The Third Claim of plaintiff's Amended Complaint, upon which 
plaintiff has moved for summary judgment, is based upon Exhibit C 
to plaintiff's Amended Complaint — an "Account of Debits and 
Credits," apparently prepared by plaintiff's counsel, and upon 
plaintiff's Affidavit, which refers to the contract between 
plaintiff and Werner's. Put simply, plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment rests upon plaintiff's claim that the 1987 
Mercedes was a "trade-in." 
Under Utah law, summary judgment may be granted based upon a 
contractual provision only when the terms of the contract are 
"complete, clear, and unambiguous." Colonial Leasing Co. v. 
Larsen Brothers Construction Co., 731 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986). 
Mr. Harrison's own deposition testimony was that the written 
agreement did not represent the complete agreement between the 
parties. Accordingly, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
not well taken and should be denied. 
In contrast, the Power of Attorney signed by plaintiff, the 
Affidavit of Ron Dreitzler and the testimony of Patty Householder 
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maKe it clear mat tne parties aia nor mtena ror tne iys/ 
Mercedes to be a trade-in. The evidence shows that both 
Dreitzler and Householder believed Harrison has remained the 
owner of the 1987 Mercedes at all times. Further, in the Power 
of Attorney, plaintiff avers (under oath) that he is the bona 
fide owner of the 1987 Mercedes. 
The foregoing facts are consistent with Mr, Harrison's 
actions: he borrowed $14,000.00 using the 1987 Mercedes to secure 
the loan and he later changed the terms of that loan agreement 
but continued to have it secured in part by the 1987 Mercedes. 
If Mr. Harrison had "traded-in" the Mercedes to Werner's, he 
would not have owned it; he would not have signed a Power of 
Attorney averring he owned it; and he would have been unable -
legally - to use it as security with Draper Bank and Trust. 
Thus, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the 1987 
Mercedes was not, nor has it ever been, "traded" to defendant 
Werner's. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Harrison's Motion for Summary Judgment is insufficient 
as a matter of law and should be denied. Mr. Harrison never 
"traded" the 1987 Mercedes and he has no claim based upon any 
alleged "trade-in." Simply stated, Mr. Harrison cannot "trade" 
the 198 7 Mercedes and be the wowner" of the vehicle at the same 
7 
time. The evidence is clear: Mr. Harrison has owned, and 
currently does own, the 1987 Mercedes, His Motion for Summary 
Judgment is without merit and not supported by the facts or any 
legal precepts* 
DATED this 0 day of J Ow , 1998. 
^ 
Respectfully submitted, 
Lp-W-s—Dyer 
Kevin C. Timken 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Pbg/Werners2.p&a/C0L4 
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